The highest provincial courts of Saskatchewan and Ontario both found the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (“the Act”), better known as the ‘carbon tax’, constitutional. But not everyone agrees.[1]

Debating the constitutionality of the ‘carbon tax’ appears to be the new national pastime. Alberta and Manitoba have filed challenges of the Act’s constitutionality.[2] Saskatchewan has appealed a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (“SKCA”) decision[3] to the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) and Doug Ford has said that Ontario will also be appealing an Ontario Court of Appeal (“ONCA”) decision[4] to the SCC.[5]

The tentative date for the Saskatchewan appeal is December 5, 2019.[6] In anticipation of the upcoming appeals, this article reviews the main arguments made in the Saskatchewan and Ontario challenges, and the Courts’ rulings.

Introduction

The federal and provincial governments, and the judges hearing the appeals, all agreed on the seriousness of climate change, and the pressing need to limit greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.[7] The science of climate change, and the impact of GHGs on climate change, were not disputed.[8] There was also agreement that it is not the Courts’ responsibility to determine the efficiency of the ‘carbon tax’.[9] The Courts simply determine the constitutionality of the Act.

Environmental laws can be contentious because authority over the environment was never exclusively delegated to either the federal or provincial governments.[10] The issue in these cases is that the provinces and the federal government disagree on what Parliament legally has the authority to do to fight GHG emissions.

The Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act

The Act ensures a “minimum national price on GHG emissions”.[11] The goal is to encourage innovation, the reduction of emissions, and the use of clean technologies.[12] The Act only applies in provinces where the Governor in Council (generally, the federal Cabinet) determines that provincial pricing is too low– the Act operates as a backstop.[13]

The Act contains four parts, but the arguments in the Courts focused on whether Parts 1 & 2 are unconstitutional.[14]

Part 1 is a levy on fuels that produce GHGs and combustible waste.[15] Part 2 is an output-based performance system for large industrial facilities.[16] Such facilities are charged a levy when their GHG emissions are higher than allowed.[17] Facilities covered by Part 2 are exempt from the Part 1 fuel levy.[18]

The Issues

The Courts considered the following main issues.

1. Are Parts 1 & 2 taxes or a regulatory scheme?
   • If taxes, then the federal government has the authority to pass the Act.[19]
     • The Attorney General of Saskatchewan (“Saskatchewan”) argues that Parts 1 & 2 are taxes and claims that the federal government did not follow the Constitution’s rules for creating a tax.[20]
   • If a regulatory scheme, the federal government must prove a Constitution Act, 1867 power grants them authority to pass the Act.
     • The Attorney General of Canada (“Canada”) claims Parts 1 & 2 are regulatory charges.[21]
     • The Attorney General of Ontario (“Ontario”), agrees the Act is a regulatory scheme, but claims the Act does not have the constitutionally required connection between the charges and its regulatory purpose.[22]
2. Can the federal government justify creating the law as addressing a ‘national concern’?[23]

The Majority Judgments from the SKCA and ONCA

Regulatory Schemes and Taxes

Although a levy can appear to be a tax, if it meets certain criteria, it becomes a regulatory scheme instead. This means the levy would not be constitutional through Parliament’s authority to impose taxes, but also would not have to meet the constitutional requirements of a tax.

The SKCA determined that Parts 1 & 2 are a regulatory scheme, fulfilling constitutional requirements for such a scheme:

1. they are complete and detailed codes of regulation;
2. their regulatory purpose is to incentivize behavioural changes that will reduce GHG emissions;
3. the charge is the means of advancing the regulatory purpose; and
4. paying the charge is the connection that a person or business will have with the regulation.[24]

The facts that money raised under Part 1 had to be distributed back to the provinces (as opposed to tax dollars which can be used “for any purpose in any part of the country” (emphasis in original)), and that the objectives of the Act could be accomplished without raising any money (if every province had their own, sufficient GHG pricing) also influenced the SKCA.[25]

The ONCA came to the same conclusion, emphasizing a connection exists “where the charges themselves have a regulatory purpose, such as the regulation of a certain behaviour” (emphasis in original) and that the levies of the Act “are constitutional regulatory charges.”[26]

GHG Emissions and the National Concern

The Constitution Act, 1867 includes a preamble to section 91 (the list of federal government powers), popularly called the Peace, Order and Good Government or POGG clause. The ability to make laws under POGG was originally included in the Constitution as a catch all. The intention was that any area of law that was not originally divided between the provinces and Parliament would become the federal government’s responsibility.[27] POGG powers have evolved to three justifications:

1. Emergency: “the temporary and extraordinary need for national regulation of a particular subject matter”;
2. Residual: “the power to make laws on matters that are not enumerated” in the Constitution;
3. National Concern: “the power to make laws in relation to matters that go beyond local or provincial concerns or interests, and are, due to their inherent nature, concerns of the Dominion of Canada as a whole.”[28]

The Courts considered the following points to determine if a matter like the carbon tax can be of national concern and therefore a federal responsibility:

1. the justification applies to both new matters, and matters that are not emergencies but have become a national concern;
2. 1. the Act in question must be have an indivisibility and singleness that distinguishes it from provincial matters; and
   2. a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that does not upset the balance of powers between Parliament and the provinces found in the Constitution; and

3. when deciding the singleness, distinctiveness, and indivisibility of a matter, it is appropriate to consider how a province would be affected if another province failed to effectively regulate the matter within its own borders.[29]

The SKCA noted that generally, the aim of the Act is GHG pricing, but its specific purpose is “the establishment of minimum national standards of price stringency for GHG emissions.”[30]

The ONCA characterized the Act wider, as “establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and found that “a minimum national standard of stringency for the pricing of GHG emissions” is how Parliament chose to accomplish its goal.[31]

The Courts then considered whether these characterizations met the national concern justification for a federal power with respect to the carbon tax.

1. The SKCA acknowledged that the matter is serious enough to be considered “for inclusion under the national concern branch of POGG.”[32] The ONCA noted that the establishment of minimum standards to fight GHGs was not an issue at the time of Confederation, but has since become a matter of national concern.[33]
2. 1. The Courts noted that GHGs as a pollutant are easily identified and a distinct type of pollution.[34] The SKCA found that there is no problem defining the Act’s operational boundaries, and the ONCA found that as a minimum standard the Act still allows provinces to legislate more stringently if they want to.[35]
   2. The SKCA determined that the Act’s impact on provincial jurisdiction was limited to an acceptable amount and would not upset the balance of powers.[36] The ONCA decided that the characterization of the Act as a minimum standard ensures that Parliament is not being granted authority over “all regulation of GHG emissions.”[37] Parliament is simply granted the ability to “address the risk of provincial inaction regarding a problem that requires cooperative action.”[38]
3. Both Courts noted that because GHG emissions do not “respect provincial boundaries,” the failure of one province to regulate negatively impacts other provinces.[39] Another concern is “carbon leakage” - businesses moving to provinces without carbon pricing to gain an economic advantage while continuing to pollute.[40]

Both Courts concluded that under the national concern branch of POGG, the purpose and character of the Act make the Act constitutionally valid.[41]

Not All Judges Agreed

Regulatory Schemes and Taxes

In the SKCA, two judges found that Part 1 of the Act is in fact a tax and not a regulatory scheme.[42] They then agreed with Saskatchewan’s claim that the Act does not meet the constitutional requirements of a tax because:

1. there was no clear delegation of Parliament’s taxing authority;
2. the authority to modify granted to the executive branch is problematically “sweeping;” and
3. since the Act serves as a backstop and a federal levy is only imposed on some provinces and to varying degrees, “uniformity of taxation” is missing and the levy is invalid.[43]

GHG Emissions and the National Concern

The two minority judges from the SKCA found that the Act could not be justified by the national concern branch of POGG.[44] Because of the large number of activities that create GHG emissions, provincial authority would be impacted too heavily if Parliament were granted the authority to regulate the matter.[45]

In the ONCA, one judge agreed the Act is constitutional, but believed that the power should be defined as “establishing minimum national greenhouse gas emissions pricing standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”[46] This characterization would reduce the impact on provincial ability to regulate GHG emissions, better maintaining the constitutional balance of powers.[47]

Another judge from the ONCA disagreed entirely and believed “the Act should be characterized more simply: it regulates GHG emissions.”[48] Categorization needs to describe the subject matter that is a national concern, and not the means in which the problem is being addressed.[49] Provinces have the ability to legislate over GHG emissions, and simply adding the word national, does not create a matter of national concern.[50]

This judge would rule the Act is not a valid use of the national concern branch of POGG.[51]

Conclusion

For future challenges to the constitutionality of the ‘carbon tax’ it appears that we can anticipate two primary arguments; whether the Act is actually a tax, and whether the regulation of GHG emissions is a national concern. With the SKCA decision being a 3-2 split, and the later ONCA decision a 4-1 split, we await a Supreme Court of Canada resolution of the matter.

 

 

 

[1]Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12, s186.

[2]Elisha Dacey, “Manitoba won’t abandon carbon tax lawsuit, says Premier Brian Pallister”, Global News (4 July 2019), online: <globalnews.ca>; “Supreme Court set to hear Sask. Carbon tax challenge in December”, CBC (25 June 2019), online: <cbc.ca>.

[3]Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40 .

[4]Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 .

[5]Maham Abedi, “2 provincial courts sided with Trudeau’s carbon tax – what happens next?”, Global News (28 June 2019), online: <globalnews.ca>.

[6]Ibid.

[7]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 4.

[8]Ibid at para 15.

[9]GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 109.

[10]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 7.

[11]Ibid at para 5.

[12]GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 34.

[13]GGPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 5.

[14]Ibid at paras 35, 46-47.

[15]Ibid at para 5.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid at para 282.

[19]Constitution Act, 1867(UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(3).

[20]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 70.

[21]Ibid.

[22]GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 150.

[23]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 52.

[24]Ibid at paras 80-84, 91-95.

[25]Ibid at paras 85-87.

[26]Supra note 4 at para 151, 163.

[27]Patrick J. Monahan, Byron Shaw & Padraic Ryan, Constitutional Law, 5^thed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2017) at 263; See generally Constitution Act, supra note 19, ss 91-95 (these sections contain the constitutional distribution of legislative powers).

[28]Legal and Legislative Affairs Division & Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Bill S-7: An Act to deter terrorism and to amend the State Immunity Act, by Jennifer Bird & Julia Nicol, (Legislative Summary), Publication No. 40-3-S7-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 26 April 2010) at 19, n 31.

[29]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 117.

[30]Ibid at paras 119, 125.

[31]Supra note 4 at para 77.

[32]Supra note 3 at para 148.

[33]Supra note 4 at paras 104-105.

[34]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 151.

[35]Ibid at para 152; GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 115.

[36]Supra note 3 at para 159.

[37]Supra note 4 at para 131.

[38]Ibid.

[39]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at paras 154-155; GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 117.

[40]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 155; GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 120.

[41]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 164; GGPPA ONCA, supra note 4 at para 139.

[42]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at para 329.

[43]GGPPA SKCA, supra note 3 at paras 359, 366, 382-384, 388.

[44]Ibid at para 475.

[45]Ibid at para457.

[46]Supra note 4 at paras 166, 190.

[47]Ibid at para 190.

[48]Ibid at para 213.

[49]Ibid at para 225.

[50]Ibid at para 229.

[51]Ibid at para 238.

Whenever a piece of Canadian legislation, such as the Constitution, mentions the ‘Governor in Council’ this refers to the Governor General acting by and with the advice of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada.[1] In practice, this means the Governor General acting on advice given by federal Cabinet – the Privy Council’s operative branch.

The ‘Governor in Council’ has been assigned many duties, some of which include:

• Giving a royal recommendation for any bill that proposes to spend government revenues;
• Giving Royal Assent in order for a bill to become law;
• Dissolving Parliament before elections;
• Opening and closing parliamentary sessions;
• Appointing many senior governmental officers (these appointments are called “Governor in Council appointments” [2]); and
• Appointing the Lieutenant Governors of each Canadian province.[3]

Lieutenant Governors represent the reigning monarch at the provincial level.[4] Their role within their respective provinces resembles that of the Governor General at the federal level.[5] For this reason, provincial legislation often refers to the ‘Lieutenant Governor in Council’. This refers to a Lieutenant Governor acting by and with the advice of his or her provincial cabinet.

 

---

[1] Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 13, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5 .

[2] Canada, “Governor in Council appointment process overview” (29 February 2016), online: <www.appointments.gc.ca/prsnt.asp?page=Process&lang=eng>.

[3] Parliament of Canada “Parliamentary Framework - General Article: Crown and Governor General” (October 2015), online: <www.parl.gc.ca/About/House/Compendium/web-content/c_g_parliamentaryframework-e.htm>; Parliament of Canada ‘Parliamentary Framework – Detailed Article: Role of the Crown and the Governor General” (October 2015), online: <www.parl.gc.ca/About/House/Compendium/web-content/c_d_rolecrowngovernorgeneral-e.htm>; Jacques Monet, “Governor General” (18 July 2012) The Canadian Encyclopedia, online: <www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/governor-general/>.

[4] Constitution Act, supra note 1 at s 58.

[5] The British Royal Family, “Canada: The Governor-General and the Lieutenant Governors”, online: <https://www.royal.uk/canada>.

The Constitution sets out the Powers of Parliament and grants Parliament the ability “to make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada.”[1] This power is known as POGG power and embedded within it are Parliament’s emergency powers. Parliament needs emergency powers so that it can quickly pass temporary laws to deal with wars or other national crises.[2]

On June 17, 2019 the House of Commons voted to declare that Canada is in a national climate emergency.[3] The motion recognizes among other things that “climate change is a real and urgent crisis,” that action is necessary to “meaningfully reduce greenhouse gas emissions,” and that Canada needs to commit to meeting its Paris Agreement emissions target.[4] The declaration of a national climate emergency is an expression of the House’s stance on climate change - it sends a message about the government’s perspective. But it changes nothing because it was passed as a resolution and not an order. A resolution is “a declaration of opinion or purpose” whereas an order gives a direction that requires action.[5] However, Parliament does have the power to act and pass new laws in response to emergencies, and this article will discuss those.

Parliament’s Emergency Powers

Parliament’s emergency powers can be classified into two categories: using the emergency branch under POGG, and using the Emergencies Act.

• Emergency Branch: Peace, Order, and Good Government (“POGG”)

The Constitution includes a section called Peace, Order and Good Government that allows Parliament to uphold laws that would ordinarily be unconstitutional because they are outside of Parliament’s listed areas of authority (aka the provincial areas of authority). Those federal areas of authority, or ‘powers’ are all listed in section 91 of the Constitution and, among others, the list includes powers like currency, navigation, copyrights, the postal service, regulation of trade and commerce, and the military.[6] The ability to make laws under POGG was originally included in the Constitution as a catch all. The intention was that any area of law that was not originally divided between the provinces and Parliament would become Parliament’s responsibility.[7] POGG powers have since been narrowed to three branches of power:

1. Emergency: “the temporary and extraordinary need for national regulation of a particular subject matter”;
2. Residual: “the power to make laws on matters that are not enumerated” in the Constitution;
3. National Concern: “the power to make laws in relation to matters that go beyond local or provincial concerns or interests, and are, due to their inherent nature, concerns of the Dominion of Canada as a whole.”[8]

When the government declares it must act because of an emergency and the appropriate response is outside of its authority, then Parliament can use the emergency branch of POGG to uphold the passing of an ordinarily unconstitutional law.

Use of the emergency branch has been few and far between in Canada’s history. It was first used in 1882 to uphold a Parliamentary foray into prohibition. The Court found that Parliament had the ability to enact prohibition laws with the aim of achieving public order.[9] The word emergency was not actually used until 1923 when matters related to war were determined to almost automatically fall under the jurisdiction of POGG.[10] What are considered emergencies was not summarized until 1946 when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council listed war, pestilence, drink or drug traffic, and the carrying of arms as examples.[11] But without a specific definition, what might be considered an emergency, and therefore, what powers Parliament has under POGG’s emergency branch remains uncertain.

As it currently stands, there are two requirements for the use of Parliament’s emergency powers to make laws. First, there must be a rational basis for the legislation and second, the legislation must be of a temporary nature.[12] These requirements mean that there has to be a genuine and reasonable belief that an emergency exists, and that the solution presented has a time limit associated with it. The Supreme Court of Canada listed these requirements when deciding whether a law passed by Parliament to combat inflation in the 1970s (that clearly encroached on provincial authority) using the emergency branch, was constitutional.[13] It did not want Parliament to be able to arbitrarily, or indefinitely encroach on the provinces’ powers.

The most notorious use of the emergency powers of POGG is easily identifiable in Parliament’s invocation of the War Measures Act (“WMA”). Parliament first passed the WMA in response to the onset of World War I.[14] The act granted the Governor in Council the ability to proclaim apprehension or existence of war, stated that such a proclamation was proof of the existence of such conditions, and allowed the Governor in Council to make any orders or regulations they saw fit to maintain the “security, defence, peace, order and welfare in Canada.”[15] The term Governor in Council is used when the Governor General acts on the advice of just the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as opposed to Parliament as a whole (the Senate and the House of Commons).[16] The WMA also explicitly granted the Governor in Council authority over such matters as censorship of publications, arrest, detention, deportation, and appropriation of property.[17] One of the abuses that resulted from use of the WMA was the internment of individuals who were members of organizations inspired by the Bolshevik Revolution.[18]

The WMA was invoked two more times to deal with WWII and the October Crisis in 1970.[19] All three uses of the WMA have led to claims of human rights violations, notably the internment of Canadians.[20] The WMA was criticized for the sweeping powers that it provided the government, and Parliament sought to remedy this by replacing the WMA with the Emergencies Act (“EA”).[21]

Emergencies Act

In an attempt to remedy the controversies surrounding the WMA and to codify (but not definitively list) its emergency powers, Parliament replaced the WMA with the EA. Both of these acts were possible under the emergency powers of POGG. However, Parliament’s emergency powers cannot be entirely defined or contained within one act of legislation.[22] This means that if there was an emergency or a response that fell outside of the scope of the EA, Parliament would still have the constitutional authority to make laws to handle the emergency. The EA seeks to limit the sweeping powers that the WMA granted, and to quell fears that the government could trample over people’s rights. The EA does this by:

• requiring Parliamentary oversight (both houses of Parliament passing a motion confirming the declaration of an emergency);
• requiring compliance by the Governor in Council with the Charter, the Canadian Bill of Rights and consideration of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
• implementing compensation provisions.[23]

The EA permits the Governor in Council to take “special temporary measures” in times of national emergency.[24] A national emergency is a situation that is temporary, urgent and critical, and that endangers the health and safety of Canadians to a point where provinces are unable to deal with it, or that threatens Parliament’s regular ability to ensure the security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Canada.[25]

National emergencies are then grouped into four categories:

1. Public Welfare Emergencies: deals with emergencies such as natural disasters, diseases, and pollution;[26]
2. Public Order Emergencies: deals with emergencies because of threats to the security of Canada;[27]
3. International Emergencies: deals with emergencies where the use of force or violence has been threatened or is imminent and involves Canada and one or more other countries;[28]
4. War Emergencies: deals with war or armed conflict for Canada or its allies.[29]

Although Parliament has passed the EA, it has never been used.[30] It appears that either the provinces have been able to handle any emergencies on their own, or that existing laws have been sufficient and the government has not needed to use the powers provided by the EA.

Emergency Powers and the Climate Emergency

In passing the declaration of a national climate emergency, Canada follows Ireland and the UK’s lead.[31] National governments are not the only ones paying attention. Climate change has been listed by the Bank of Canada as one of the main risks facing the Canadian economy.[32] Canadian municipalities from every corner of the country have already declared climate emergencies, all the way from Halifax, across to Vancouver, and up to Old Crow, Yukon.[33]

However, the declaration of a national climate emergency by the House of Commons has no new law associated with it, does not invoke emergency powers, and at this point appears to be symbolic. It appears to be an effort to place Canada on the international stage as a combater of climate change.[34] Does it have any real power? No. Without any new policy attached to it, the declaration seems “toothless.”[35]

But perhaps Parliament’s characterization of climate change as an emergency sets the stage for less confrontation should Parliament choose to use its emergency powers. Or maybe the courts will look to this declaration as the rational belief necessary in an emergency that is required to make use of emergency powers.

 

[1]Constitution Act, 1867(UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91.

[2]Patrick J. Monahan, Byron Shaw & Padraic Ryan, Constitutional Law, 5^thed (Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2017) at 264.

[3]Canada, House of Commons Journal, 42-1, No 435 (17 June 2019) at 5663.

[4]Ibid at 5660-5661.

[5]House of Commons, Compendium of Procedure, (online collection of articles <ourcommons.ca>), Private Members’ Business at detailed article on Motions.

[6]Constitution Act, supra note 1.

[7]Monahan, supra note 2 at 263. See generally Constitution Act, supra note 1 at ss 91-95 (these sections contain the constitutional distribution of legislative powers).

[8]Legal and Legislative Affairs Division & Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Bill S-7: An Act to deter terrorism and to amend the State Immunity Act, by Jennifer Bird & Julia Nicol, (Legislative Summary), Publication No. 40-3-S7-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 26 April 2010) at 19, n 31.

[9]Russel v The Queen, [1882] 7 AC 829.

[10]Re: Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 SCR 373 at 407, 68 DLR (3d) 452 (Chief Justice Laskin made note of this when referring to the Fort Frances case).

[11]Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] 2 DLR 1 at 5-6, [1946] AC 193; The Constitutional Law Group, Canadian Constitutional Law, 5^thed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2017) at 177 (the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England was the highest court of appeal in Canada until 1949).

[12]Anti-Inflation, supra note 10 at 423, 427.

[13]Ibid at 380, 392.

[14]Law and Government Division, Emergencies Act, by Peter Niemczak & Peter Rosen, PRB 01-14E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 10 October 2001) at 1.

[15]Ibid.

[16]House of Commons, Compendium of Procedure, (online collection of articles <ourcommons.ca>), at Parliamentary Framework.

[17]War Measures Act, 5 George V 1914, c 2, s 6.

[18]Law and Government Division, supra note 14 at 2.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Marjun Parcasio, “The Evolution of the War Measures Act”, LawNow relating law to life in Canada 43:3 (3 January 2019), online: <lawnow.org>.

[21]Law and Government Division, supra note 14 at 2.

[22]Monahan, supra note 2 at 267.

[23]Ibidat 9; Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4^thSupp), s 58.

[24]Emergencies Act, supra note 23 at preamble.

[25]Ibid, s 3.

[26]Ibid, s 5.

[27]Ibid, s 16.

[28]Ibid, s 27.

[29]Ibid, s 37.

[30]Legal and Social Affairs Division & Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Parliamentary Committee Review of Regulations, by Peter Bernhardt & Michael Dewing, (Background Paper), Publication No. 2005-63-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 18 December 2008, revised 4 May 2015) at 5.

[31]Tiffany Crawford, “Daily poll: Should Canada join other countries and declare a climate emergency?”, Vancouver Sun (10 May 2019), online: <vancouversun.com>.

[32]Bank of Canada, “Financial System Review Summary – 2019”, (16 May 2019), online: <bankofcanada.ca>.

[33]Crawford Supranote 4; Heather Avery, “Old Crow, Yukon, declares climate change state of emergency”, CBC (21 May 2019), online: <cbc.ca>.

[34]Rebecca Joseph, “What is a climate emergency? Liberals, NDP table duelling motions on climate change”, Global News (16 May 2019), online: <globalnews.ca>.

[35]Hilary Beaumont, “Declaring a ‘Climate Emergency’ Is Meaningless Without Strong Policy”, Vice (29 May 2019), online: <vice.com>.